Peer reviewed paper his paper puts forward the case for applying a systems approach to the analysis of hospital-based infection outbreaks. A major advantage of the systems approach is that it affords insights into how actions or occurrences at one system level (e.g. individual error) collectively interact with team (e.g. leadership style) and organisational (e.g. safety culture) levels of analysis. Most of the research concerned with behavioural aspects of infection control has focused on a single level of analysis (e.g. interventions to improve hand washing). The infection outbreaks at the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust are used as a case study in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the systems approach. The paper further outlines the human and organisational issues raised by the analysis and provides a means through which these aspects of infection can be highlighted as part of a future research agenda.
Introduction
Over the past few years the subject of hospital infection control has become the subject of much media attention (e.g. Guardian , 2007 ; BBC's Panorama, 2008 ) . A number of high profi le hospital outbreaks within the United Kingdom (UK) involving bacterium such as Clostridium diffi cile and meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and the number of mortalities resulting from these outbreaks, has made infection control into a central priority for the NHS and other healthcare systems worldwide ( Allegranzi et al, 2007 ) . Much of the debate so far has concentrated on improving hygiene within hospitals (e.g. hand washing). Very little research has been conducted on the wider behavioural, social and organisational factors that may also determine infection control outbreaks ( Griffi ths et al, 2008 ) . The intention of the present study is to outline the potential of adopting a systems ergonomic perspective towards hospital-based infections.
The systems approach and systems ergonomics Systems ergonomics, examines large-scale issues such as the analysis and improvement of work environments that involve social and technical ('sociotechnical') elements including organisational structures, policies and procedures. Likewise, the systems approach involves a detailed examination of how these factors interact with one another and how they are distributed across a range of system levels and interfaces (e.g. management, staff and individual levels). A number of different types of accidents, disasters and large-scale system failures have been analysed in the past, spanning a range of domains including transportation (e.g. the Paddington rail accident -Santos- Reyes and Beard, 2006 ; Wilson et al, 2007 ) , nuclear power (e.g. the Chernobyl disaster - Reason, 1987 Reason, , 2008 and patient safety ( Vincent, 2006 ) .
Hospitals represent good examples of complex large-scale sociotechnical systems because they involve a large diversity of professions that span a range of roles and specialisms as well as technologies and artefacts ranging from the latest eHealth applications (e.g. electronic patient record systems) to more established physical design components (e.g. wards and buildings). Within systems ergonomics, a number of modelling frameworks exist (e.g. Vicente, 2006 ; Rasmussen, 1997 ) for understanding the dynamic interaction between levels within large-scale sociotechnical systems (Figure 1 ). Vicente and Christoffersen (2006) have used the framework to identify the lessons learnt from the May 2000 outbreak of Escherichia coli that occurred in Walkerton, Canada. Their analysis used a graphical representation of the contributing factors that led up to the Walkerton outbreak. These ranged from decisions made at governmental levels (e.g. privatisation initiatives), the action of actors within the system (e.g. failures to take water samples), as well as equipment failures (e.g. shallow water wells). In order to demonstrate the value of applying the systems approach and these types of modelling frameworks to infection control, the paper focuses on a specifi c case study, namely the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust outbreaks in the UK, which occurred between 2005 and 2007 (Healthcare Commission (HC), 2007) .
Trust as a result of becoming infected with C. diffi cile ( HC, 2007 , p.5) . Table 1 shows a timescale that summarises the main events as they occurred at the trust.
Contributory factors leading up to the outbreaks
The Healthcare Commission report identifi ed a number of factors that contributed to the outbreaks that occurred within the trust. These can be summarised in terms of fi ve main themes: the role played by external organisations; management of the trust; clinical management on the hospital wards; the role played by the infection control team; and equipment and hygiene factors.
The role of external organisations
Within the report both the setting of government-led targets and fi nancial pressures on NHS trusts are mentioned as background, contributory factors that had an impact on the day-to-day operation of the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust. In particular, the report mentions the need for trust board members and managers to meet targets for the use of beds. Higher bed occupancy meant that there was less time for the cleaning and a higher probability of transmission of infection between patients ( HC, 2007 , pp. 69-70) . The need to meet fi nancial targets also placed pressure on the trust to decrease spending in areas that impacted upon infection control, such as fi nancing for new buildings and isolation areas.
Infection control within the UK's National Health Service (NHS) is overseen by a number of bodies including the Health Protection Agency (HPA). The remit of the HPA is to provide advice and support to the NHS, local authorities and other agencies with regard to public health issues. The creation of the HPA in April 2005 coincided with the fi rst outbreak at the trust. One part of the HPA, the Health Protection Unit (HPU), was set up in order to support organisations in their management of infections. The report highlights that this caused some confusion within the trust at the time of the outbreaks, as the expectation was that the HPU could provide guidance covering the supervision and monitoring of infection control. The HPU did not have close involvement with the trust and generally worked in a reactive way, responding to concerns as they arose ( HC, 2007 , p. 8) . Similar problems were encountered within the much larger Strategic Health Authority (SHA), who are responsible for implementing government policy and fi scal control within regions of the UK.
Management of the trust
The report describes a catalogue of problems and failures associated with the management of the trust at the time of the outbreaks. In terms of clinical risks and incidents, management strategy in general 'had been fragmentary and poorly understood' ( HC, 2007 , p. 77) . The reports from an internal group set up within the trust in order to analyse complaints, claims and incidents highlight, among others, the following issues: the unsatisfactory nature of some 'escalation' areas (areas temporarily set up to deal with infected patients); the impact that the accident and emergency (A&E) target had on the quality of care; poor quality handover and transfer to wards from A&E; concerns about staffi ng levels; and bank staff managing wards on some shifts. The style of leadership within the trust and the overall management culture were also criticised in the report. Many staff described the leadership of the chief executive as being 'autocratic' or 'dictatorial' ( HC, 2007 p. 91) . The report concluded that the person appointed as director of infection prevention and control had 'no real understanding of the role at the outset' ( HC, 2007 , p. 5) . Turnover of managers and directors was also high. Peer reviewed paper Finally, the trust's management of staffi ng was criticised heavily within the report in several places. In 2006/07 the number of nurses per bed was 1.52, the same number as in 2003/04 ( HC, 2007 , p. 82) . Trust managers had not carried out a comprehensive review of staffi ng levels or a determination of minimum staffi ng levels.
Clinical management on the hospital wards
A review of the case notes of 50 patients who had died having had C. diffi cile found that in 80 % of the cases, at least one element of the clinical management, or monitoring of C. diffi cile at ward level was unsatisfactory ( HC, 2007 , p. 4) . A number of elements were mentioned, including: infrequent reviews of patients by doctors; lack of systematic monitoring as to whether or not a patient was recovering from C. diffi cile ; and failure to change antibiotic treatment when a patient did not respond to the initial treatment ( HC, 2007 , p. 4) . Delays in starting treatment occurred on the wards, mostly because there was a delay in sending samples for analysis ( HC, 1007 , p. 33) . There was also little evidence that once C. diffi cile had been diagnosed, that patients were monitored for severe signs of the infection ( HC, 2007 , p. 34) . In other cases, it was clear that diagnoses were either not considered or had been missed. In 34 % of the cases reviewed, medical records did not indicate that a regular review of C. diffi cile had taken place ( HC, 2007 , p. 38) . The management of fl uids and nutrition on the wards was also inconsistent. In 36% of the cases there was evidence of poor fl uid management and in 34 % nutritional needs had not been assessed or managed ( HC, 2007 , p. 38) .
The infection control team
The role played by the infection control team within the trust was a complex one and one made diffi cult by problems relating to accountability, the amount of resources available to them, and their ability to function as a team. The arrangements for accountability were not clear ( HC, 2007 , p. 54 ) and it was not clear who was responsible for the team. Infection control nurses were accountable to the director of nursing, but the pathology manager held the budget for these nurses, and did not consider that he had any management responsibility for infection control. It was not until September 2006 that the trust took steps to clarify the management of the team ( HC, 2007 , p. 51) .
Equipment and hygiene
Hygiene practices within the trust and the state of hospital buildings contributed a great deal to the outbreaks. Wards, bathrooms and commodes were not clean and patients had in some cases to share equipment (e.g. Zimmer frames) that were not cleaned before use ( HC, 2007 , p. 4) . The infection control team were keen to isolate patients once they had been identifi ed as C. diffi cile cases, however the scarcity of side rooms made this diffi cult. As a result many patients before and after the outbreaks were kept on open wards. The design of buildings and their age meant that many wards did not have suffi cient space for storage or the provision of hand basins in utility rooms. The buildings in the trust were generally old or in a poor state of repair and when they were fi rst opened did not have adequate cleaning and laundry services ( HC, 2007 , p. 6) .
Analysing the outbreaks using the systems approach
The outbreaks that occurred within the Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Trust represent the combined impact of a complex set of factors extending over several years. In common with most examples of accidents, disasters or large-scale adverse events, the outbreaks are best interpreted as arising through the combination of a number of interrelated systemic factors and infl uences ( Turner, 1978 ; Reason, 2008 ) . Figure 2 attempts to use some of the elements of the systems ergonomic frameworks described earlier in the paper ( Figure 1 ) in order to further analyse the outbreaks. To illustrate the framework as it applies to the outbreaks, a small sample of the contributory factors are used to link together some of the system components. Government, regulatory bodies and trust governance At the very highest level of the system it is diffi cult to pinpoint exactly the role played by government-set targets as a discrete factor leading to the outbreaks. Targets placed many individuals, particularly those at trust board and management levels under a great deal of pressure. This pressure in itself may have led them to make poor decisions, and in some cases to prioritise bed occupancy rates at the expense of the risk of an infection outbreak. Previous research on the infl uence that targets have on management decision-making in health care tends to be equivocal. Bean and Hood (2006) , for example, show that the impact of satisfying a specifi c target (e.g. hospital waiting times) has not been analysed in terms of how this infl uences other related services (e.g. quality of care). Others have suggested that healthcare targets represent: 'tin openers rather than dials … they do not give answers but prompt further investigation and inquiry, and by themselves provide an incomplete and inaccurate answer' ( Carter et al, 1995 ) . Within the trust it is likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the system as a whole and this pressure fi ltered down various levels of the system. It is possible that the drive to comply with these targets increased the likelihood of an adverse event or set of events taking place at some stage within the trust. Poor communication, confusion of responsibilities and accountabilities between and within the various regulatory bodies delayed the time in which they could react to the outbreaks. A separate report by the Healthcare examined the underlying causes of serious failures in NHS healthcare providers and identifi ed largescale organisational processes such as mergers and poor change management procedures as common factors. Within the wider literature on large-scale accidents and disasters (e.g. Perrow, 1999 Perrow, , 2007 the nature of organisational linkages and structures are also widely acknowledged to be signifi cant explanatory factors.
Government

Hospital management
Within the hospital the actions of senior managers were identifi ed as signifi cantly contributing to the failure to prevent and deal with the outbreaks. The link between management, human resource management (HRM) practices and work performance outcomes has been investigated in detail over the past few years. Wood and Wall (2002) , for example, reviewed the evidence that suggests there is a link between high-involvement HRM practices and employee productivity. High involvement HRM practices typically include empowering employees to make their own decisions and the presence of selfmanaged teams. The review showed that these types of practices in organisations do tend to increase levels of employee productivity. Similar effects have been shown between HRM practices and measurements of safety outcomes (e.g. number of adverse events). In general, there is strong evidence to suggest that aspects of management behaviour partially shape and determine the culture of safety within organisations (e.g. Zohar, 2000 ) . Within health care specifically, West et al (2002) carried out a large-scale survey of the relationship between HRM practices and general in-hospital mortality. The survey showed some aspects of high involvement HRM were associated with lower mortality rates after adjustment for patient and hospital characteristics.
Aside from the way in which senior managers behaved at the trust, the questions still remain as to why they ignored, or at least failed to realise the seriousness of the outbreaks and their consequences. Many of the managers interviewed in the original Healthcare Commission report said that they were aware of how serious the situation had become within the trust, but were powerless to do anything about it. One possible explanation is what Vaughan (1996) in her study of the Challenger shuttle disaster termed the 'normalization of deviance,' namely that managers over time began to accept and take for granted the level of infection risk within the trust. Only after the level of risk built up to a point where it could not be controlled, did they begin to realise the gravity of the situation.
Clinical management and equipment and buildings
Understaffi ng and general lack of resources together played a part in the outbreaks. Staffi ng ratios and levels of staff morale almost certainly contributed to the problem of containing the spread of infection on the wards. In general, the research literature provides some evidence that lower levels of staffi ng increase the likelihood of infections occurring. Hugonnet et al (2004 ) (cited in Griffi ths et al, 2008 examined the numbers of nursing staff and staff downsizing relative to infection levels. The researchers found an inverse relationship between staff downsizing and the rate of hospital-based infection. Curiously, little research has been conducted on the impact of job satisfaction/ morale on hospital infection levels, but work in other domains (e.g. manufacturing and service industries) suggests that lower levels of satisfaction are clearly linked to lower levels of job performance (e.g. Parker, 2007 ) .
It might be conjectured that the behaviour of clinicians and other healthcare professionals within the trust shares similarities with those of senior managers and trust board managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels of poor hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but saw no way to improve the situation. Weick and Sutcliffe (2003) analysed data from the Bristol Royal Infi rmary Report ( Department of Health, 2001 ) and concluded that hospital staff became locked into particular lines of action or behaviour where they 'search for confi rmation that they are doing what they should be doing' (p. 73). These so-called 'cultures of entrapment' inhibit an organisation's ability to break out of patterns of behaviour that over time can lead to adverse outcomes. In the case of the trust they may provide some means with which to explain shared boundary spanning behaviours between levels within the hospital subsystem ( Figure 1 ) .
Ways forward and conclusions
The analysis presented in this paper has shown that there are advantages in analysing hospital-based infection outbreaks from a systems perspective. Many of the issues that have been discussed have not been researched in much depth within infection control, particularly organisational and managerial behaviour. The paper has only touched upon some of the behavioural issues involved with a system as complex as hospital-based health care. Much more research needs to be carried out, the aim being that the outcomes from this can be translated into practice. We are currently in danger of only seeing one part of a much larger picture. Adopting a systems approach is one step towards fi lling in the missing details, particularly as they relate to causal relationships that may exist between system levels, such as the interaction between management styles, aspects of hospital design and individual behaviour (e.g. hand washing), and outcomes (e.g. infection rates).
